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This version: August 2004Substantial variation in recognition rates for asylum claims from the same countries of origin 
and therefore prima facie equal merit subjects refugees to unfair and discriminatory 
treatment. This article demonstrates the extent of variation and lack of convergence over the 
period 1980 to 1999 across Western European destination countries. Refugee interest groups 
also suspect that political and economic conditions in destination countries as well as the 
number of past asylum claims unduly impact upon recognition rates. This article estimates 
the determinants of asylum recognition rates. Origin-specific recognition rates vary, as they 
should, with the extent of political oppression, human rights violations, inter-state armed 
conflict and events of genocide and politicide in countries of origin. Recognition rates for the 
full protection status only are lower in times of high unemployment in destination countries. 
Such rates are also lower if many asylum seekers from a country of origin have already 
applied for asylum in the past. 
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This version: August 2004From a normative viewpoint, asylum claims should be assessed purely with regards to the 
merits of the claim. Refugee interest groups and others critical of developed countries’ 
asylum policies argue that adverse political and economic conditions can induce governments 
to use their influence on the assessment of asylum claims to deter potential future asylum 
seekers via low recognition rates (ECRE 2000a; Pro-Asyl 2003). They also suggest that 
recognition rates for prima facie similar asylum claims vary substantially across European 
Union (EU) and other Western European countries and that this variation subjects asylum 
seekers to the risk of unfair and discriminatory treatment (Noll 2000). 
In this article we will estimate the extent of variation in origin-specific recognition rates 
for both full refugee and the combined refugee and other allowance to remain statuses. We 
will analyze whether there has been convergence in recognition rates over the period 1980 to 
1999 across Western European countries, where Western Europe means Norway, Switzerland 
and the fourteen countries, which formed the EU in 1999 (for Luxembourg, the remaining EU 
country, no data are available). We find substantial variation together with a lack of 
convergence. The variation and lack of convergence in recognition rates presents reason for 
concern. Essentially, it subjects asylum seekers to the danger of arbitrariness in the 
assessment of their asylum claim depending on which country of destination their claim is 
decided upon. This might have been less problematic as long as asylum seekers could more 
or less freely choose the Western European country, in which they filed their asylum claim. 
Very unequal recognition rates have become extremely problematic since the Dublin 
Convention requires asylum seekers in EU countries to file their claim in the country of first 
entry. Restrictions on choosing one’s preferred asylum destination country – sometimes 
called somewhat pejoratively asylum-shopping – subjects asylum seekers whose claims carry 
the same substantive merit to the danger of unequal treatment contingent on where they lodge 
their asylum claim. Such discriminatory treatment violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
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This version: August 2004Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, to which all Western 
European countries are bound. It represents a frontal assault on the ethical standards of 
fairness and non-discrimination supposedly underlying the process of granting asylum. 
We also estimate the determinants of asylum recognition rates. These estimation results 
provide reason for cautious optimism as recognition rates seem to be fairly sensitive with 
respect to the likely merit of the asylum claim as recognition rates vary with the extent of 
political oppression, human rights violations, inter-state violent political conflict and events 
of genocide and politicide in countries of origin. The recognition rate for the combined full 
and other allowance to remain statuses is insensitive towards economic and political 
conditions in destination countries. However, the recognition rate for full refugee protection 
status only is somewhat more vulnerable to factors outside the merits of the asylum claims as 
both the number of origin-specific past asylum seekers and the unemployment rate in 
destination countries are negatively associated with this recognition rate. This is in 
accordance with recent trends of pushing asylum seekers into lower protection statuses in 
times of economic crises or when destination countries perceive themselves as being over-
burdened. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next section provides some statistical 
background information on asylum migration to Western Europe, followed by a discussion of 
why low recognition rates might deter asylum applications. We review existing empirical 
studies, before presenting the research design. The empirical analysis consists of convergence 
and multivariate regression analysis and is followed by a concluding section discussing the 
implications of the findings of this study. 
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This version: August 2004ASYLUM MIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the total number of asylum applications being lodged in 
industrialized countries between 1980 and 1999 averaged over periods of five years. Total 
applications in Europe have increased tremendously from the early 1980s to the early 1990s 
from a total of 592,000 to 2.65 million, falling somewhat during the latter half of the 1990s, 
but staying at a fairly high level of 1.93 million. During this period, Europe receives almost 
three quarters of all asylum applications lodged in industrialized countries, the rest mainly 
going to Northern America. Clearly, these are non-negligible numbers. On the other hand, 
UNHCR (2002: 84) estimates that in 1999 only about 28 per cent of the estimated 11.6 
million refugees worldwide were hosted by developed countries. In other words, while the 
numbers of asylum seekers coming to developed countries in general and Western Europe in 
particular have grown substantially, it is developing, not developed countries, which have to 
cope with the vast majority of refugees. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
Within Western Europe, some countries are clearly much more popular than others. 
Germany, in particular, takes by far the largest share during this period as can also be seen in 
table 1, namely almost one third of all asylum applications lodged in industrialized countries. 
Of course, partly these very large differences can be explained by the different sizes of 
destination countries. If we divide the sum of asylum applications over the period 1980 to 
1999 by population size in 1999, then Switzerland, Sweden and Austria have had more 
asylum applications per capita than Germany. Whether in absolute numbers or relative to 
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This version: August 2004population size, clearly the richer European countries are the most popular countries for 
lodging asylum applications. 
Where do people lodging asylum applications in Europe mainly come from? Table 2 lists 
the top 30 countries of origin averaged over five year periods between 1980 and 1999. There 
clearly are changes in the major sending countries over this 20-year period. For example, 
during the early 1980s many asylum seekers came from Eastern European Communist 
countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In the 1990s, after the end of the 
Cold War, only negligible numbers of asylum seekers came from these three countries, which 
have themselves turned into countries of destination, if on a very small scale. Other Eastern 
European countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia have remained major sending 
countries throughout the entire time period, however. Indeed, as a consequence of its civil 
war, more than 900,000 people from Yugoslavia asked for asylum in Western European 
countries in the 1990s, making it the top sending country during this decade. Many other 
countries have similarly been major countries of origin throughout, namely Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire), India, Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Turkey and Vietnam. It is clear from this table that asylum seekers 
come mainly from Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Central and South 
American refugees are much more likely to apply for asylum in the United States. 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Asylum seekers from particular countries often have a preferred country of destination 
and this need not be the country that is otherwise the most popular country of destination in 
aggregate terms. For example, the United Kingdom is a major destination for asylum seekers 
from Nigeria as is Belgium for Congolese asylum seekers. France attracts more asylum 
6 
This version: August 2004applications from Vietnamese people than the Netherlands (UNHCR 2002). Neumayer 
(2004) examines the destination choice by asylum seekers in Western Europe and finds that 
country-specific ties such as a shared language and former colonial links as well as 
geographical proximity are also statistically significant determinants in addition to a 
country’s income level. This study also finds that once destination countries have allowed 
significant numbers of asylum seekers from a particular country, this attracts more asylum 
seekers in the future from this country of origin due to network effects. 
Recognition rates for asylum seekers from the same origin countries can vary 
dramatically across destination countries. For example, in 1999 almost all applications for 
asylum from Iraqis were successful in the UK, that is they were either given full asylum 
status or were otherwise allowed to remain in the country. In the same year the success rate 
was just above 10 per cent in the Netherlands. Between these extremes, there is also great 
variation with, for example, Austria at 28 per cent, Germany at 43 per cent, France at 59 per 
cent and Denmark at 83 per cent. The success rate of applications from Afghanis in Germany 
in 1999 was around one quarter, but 67 and 80 per cent in Belgium and the Netherlands, 
respectively. Vietnamese applications were almost all rejected by Germany, but faced a 
success rate of 86 per cent in France. These are merely examples from one year, but a similar 
picture emerges in other years and for applications from many other countries of origin as 
well. Of course, examples do not demonstrate a systematic pattern. Doing so will be left to 
the empirical analysis provided further below. The next section discusses the effect that low 
recognition rates might have on asylum applications. 
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This version: August 2004THE EFFECT OF LOW RECOGNITION RATES ON ASYLUM 
APPLICATIONS 
 
Table 1 above has demonstrated how numbers of asylum seekers coming to Western Europe 
have increased substantially from 1980 onwards, falling again slightly in the second half of 
the 1990s. Destination countries have reacted to this increase in numbers with deterrent 
measures. While there are many ways to deter potential asylum seekers in order to reduce 
their numbers – from visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, reductions in welfare benefits to lists 
of “safe” third countries of transit – a low recognition rate signals to potential asylum seekers 
that the chances of their asylum claim becoming accepted are low. A low recognition rate 
exposes potential future asylum seekers to the risk of being sent back to their country of 
origin or to other countries of transit, which are not their chosen country of destination. 
Whatever the motivation for leaving one’s country of origin in the first place, being sent back 
or deflected to undesired third countries not only defeats the initial purpose, but is likely to 
leave the person worse off than in the initial situation given that scarce financial and other 
resources have been spent. In cases where people had fled from genuine persecution in their 
country of origin, the risk of being imprisoned, tortured or killed can well increase if their 
asylum claim is rejected and they are forced to return as additional attention is drawn to their 
person. It is exactly for this reason that non-refoulement (the prohibition to return refugees to 
places where their personal integrity is threatened) is at the heart of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Of course, as pointed out by Gibney (2000) and Gibney and Hansen (2002), relatively 
few of those whose asylum claim becomes rejected are actually made or forced to leave the 
country. They explain this with a combination of a reluctance to incur the costs of deporting 
people in terms of time, effort, financial resources and the likely controversies and conflicts 
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This version: August 2004involved together with an acknowledgement that certain humanitarian reasons stand against 
deportation. However, even when asylum seekers are allowed to remain in the country 
despite their claim for full refugee status becoming formally rejected, they often still face 
reduced rights and benefits compared to others whose asylum claim was formally accepted 
(DG for Justice and Home Affairs 2001). Low recognition rates also spur a public perception 
of the vast majority of asylum seekers as ‘bogus’ refugees, even though econometric studies 
of the determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe dispute the validity of this 
perception (Neumayer 2005). Such a public climate makes it easier for policy makers to enact 
other deterrent measures aimed at curbing the seemingly widespread abuse of a supposedly 
liberal asylum regime (UNHCR 1997). 
The deterrent effect of low recognition rates is not only plausible in theory, it has also 
been demonstrated in empirical studies. There is casual evidence that, for example, Sri 
Lankan asylum seekers have reacted to low recognition rates in Germany by seeking asylum 
in the UK instead (Robinson and Segrott 2002, 3). Similarly, most key informants in Böcker 
and Havinga’s (1997) qualitative study of asylum migration to the Netherlands, Belgium and 
the UK agreed on the deterrent effects of low recognition rates. With respect to more 
systematic evidence, Vink and Meijerink (2003) claim to have found a strong negative 
correlation between aggregate recognition rates and the total number of asylum applications 
filed in EU member states in a log-linear analysis over the period 1982 to 2001. However, the 
problem with this study is that other variables, which are likely to influence the number of 
asylum applications, are not taken into account. The negative correlation between aggregate 
recognition rates and the number of asylum applications can therefore be entirely spurious. 
However, another study, which includes many other determinants of the number of asylum 
applications, also finds a deterrent effect of low recognition rates in Western European 
countries on their share of asylum seekers (Neumayer 2004). This holds true both for the 
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This version: August 2004aggregate recognition rates as well as origin-specific recognition rates over the period 1982 to 
1999. Similarly, Holzer, Schneider and Widmer (2000a) demonstrate a deterrent effect of low 
recognition rates in their time-series analysis of asylum applications in Switzerland over the 
period 1986 to 1995.  
We can therefore conclude that a deterrent effect of low recognition rates on asylum 
applications is both plausible in theory and demonstrated in empirical studies. As a 
consequence, it becomes interesting to test whether political and economic conditions in 
destination countries impact on recognition rates or whether recognition rates are mainly 
determined by the relative merit of asylum applications. Such an analysis is exactly what this 
paper aspires to undertake. 
 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
To our knowledge, the only two existing empirical studies of the determinants of asylum 
recognition rates are Holzer and Schneider (2001) and Holzer, Schneider and Widmer 
(2000b). The latter study analyzes the handling of approximately 180,000 individual asylum 
applications in Swiss cantons over the period 1988 to 1996. Holzer, Schneider and Widmer 
(2000b) control for individual characteristics such as age, gender and marital status of 
applicants together with the date of application and dummy variables for the most important 
countries of origin. Their main interest is in explaining the different chances of asylum 
seekers with otherwise similar background to have their asylum application recognized in 
various cantons. In addition to canton fixed effects, explanatory variables included are the 
size of cantons, linguistic affiliations, salient organizational principles, residents’ attitudes 
toward asylum seekers and the share of foreigners residing in cantons. They find that, all 
other things equal, cantons with a centralized asylum administration system have lower 
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This version: August 2004recognition rates if the share of resident foreigners and the extent of negative attitudes 
towards asylum seekers are not controlled for. Once they are, the effect vanishes. Cantons 
with both a high share of resident foreigners and negative attitudes towards asylum seekers 
have low recognition rates, but those with a low share of resident foreigners have high 
recognition rates. Small and large cantons have higher recognition rates than medium-sized 
ones. Holzer, Schneider and Widmer (2000b) conclude from their results that decentralized 
decision-making can represent a threat to certain groups of refugees in terms of 
discriminatory decision-making. 
Having access to individual data is very rare and Holzer and Schneider (2001) have to 
resort to aggregate data in their analysis of the determinants of asylum recognition rates over 
the period 1983 to 1995 for Western European, EU and 15 OECD countries. They examine 
whether recognition rates are influenced by political factors such as the share of foreigners, 
the political orientation of the government, the electoral success of right-wing extremist 
parties as well as economic factors such as the economic growth, inflation and unemployment 
rate. They find that none of these factors have a statistically significant impact. Only the total 
number of asylum applications exerts a negative impact upon recognition rates. They also 
find evidence for convergence in recognition rates across groups of countries examined. 
Our analysis here is similar in spirit to the study by Holzer and Schneider (2001), which 
also needs to resort to aggregate data due to lack of alternatives. However, contrary to Holzer 
and Schneider (2001) who look at aggregate recognition rates in destination countries we use 
a dyadic research design where recognition rates are specific to both destination and origin 
countries. This dyadic research design offers two advantages of utmost importance. First, 
aggregate total recognition rates cannot truly be compared across countries because the 
origins of asylum seekers and therefore the likely merit of their asylum request differ 
dramatically across destination countries. For example, in the 1990s asylum seekers from the 
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This version: August 2004former Yugoslavia and Turkey went in much higher numbers to Germany than to other 
countries, whereas Somalis and Sri Lankans went foremost to the UK (UNHCR 2001). It is 
therefore not surprising that aggregate total recognition rates differ across destination 
countries. Second, the absence of a dyadic research design also implies that Holzer and 
Schneider (2001) cannot estimate any effect that the characteristics of origin countries have 
on recognition rates. If one wants to assess whether recognition rates vary with the presumed 
merit of asylum claims, then one needs to look at origin-specific recognition rates. It is of 
great interest whether the extent of political repression in origin countries, human rights 
violations, violent political conflict and the like have a statistically significant impact on 
recognition rates. The same is true for economic characteristics such as the average income 
level in origin countries. These questions can be addressed with our research design, which 




THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The theoretically correct recognition rate is the percentage of asylum claims recognized 
relative to the number of asylum claims lodged. Unfortunately, as many claims are not 
decided during the period they were lodged and no data on the application date of most 
claims is available, this theoretically correct recognition rate cannot be calculated (UNHCR 
2002, 58). In its absence, we follow UNHCR practice and compute recognition rates as the 
number of decisions recognizing asylum claims in any one year relative to the number of 
claims decided upon. In other words, our recognition rate does not measure the rate of 
successful applications, but the rate of successful decisions. 
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This version: August 2004We analyze two different types of recognition. One is the rate of decisions granting full 
refugee status according to the 1951 Geneva Convention. The other is the rate of decisions 
granting either full refugee status or allowance to remain for other, mostly humanitarian, 
reasons. Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to distinguish in greater detail 
amongst various protection statuses beyond these two categories. Observers have noted the 
increasing use of lower protection statuses in substitution for the full refugee protection status 
according to the standards set by the Geneva Convention (Joly 1999; Noll 2000). It follows 
that, if existent, we would expect a stronger effect of political and economic conditions in 
destination countries on the recognition rate for full refugee status than on the combined 
recognition rate as asylum claims are shifted from the full to the lower protection statuses. 
The data have been provided by the UNHCR’s statistical unit. At the time of writing, no 
data on recognition rates broken down by destination- and origin-countries were available 
after 1999, which therefore represents the end period of our study. The data are not without 
problems. To start with, for some destination countries the data cover both first instance and 
appeal decisions, whereas for other countries only the first instance decisions are covered. In 
some destination countries, cases, which are rejected on formal grounds from the start, enter 
the total number of decisions made, whereas in other countries they do not. In our estimations 
further below, we will deal with this problem with the help of destination fixed effects. In 
addition, there can be measurement errors. Note that these measurement errors enter the error 
term in our empirical estimations, which reduces the precision of our estimation results. They 
do not, however, bias our estimates as we have no reason to believe that the measurement 
error is systematically correlated with any of our explanatory variables. Also note that as 
mentioned above we have no information on when a claim decided on was actually filed. 
Decisions in any one year can therefore refer to applications from the same or earlier years. 
This is not particularly problematic as the merits of an asylum claim also depend on the 
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This version: August 2004circumstances in the country of origin at the time of decision-making. For example, asylum 
seekers who fled their countries at a time of large-scale political persecution might be denied 
asylum recognition if at the time their request is decided on the threat of persecution has 
disappeared due to a political regime change. The same argument applies vice versa. 
For some countries like Germany, France and the Netherlands, for example, there are 
much less gaps in the data on dyad-specific recognition rates than in other countries like 
Ireland and Portugal. For Luxembourg, no data were available at all. In general, there are 
more gaps in the data the further back in time one goes. 
 
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
To test whether the economic conditions in a destination country have an impact upon 
recognition rates, we include the gross domestic product per capita in constant US$ of 1997 
(GDP p.c.) and the unemployment rate (%UNEMPLOYED) in destination countries. Data are 
taken from World Bank (2001) and ILO (2003). With respect to political conditions, we want 
to test whether the share of votes in general national parliamentary elections going to so-
called right-wing populist parties such as the Front National in France, the Republikaner in 
Germany or the Vlaams Block in Belgium (%RIGHTPOPULIST) might have a negative 
impact on recognition rates. The classification of parties and data are taken from Swank 
(2002) and supplemented by Lane, McKay and Newton (1997). The electoral success of such 
parties can be understood as a shift of the median voter to the right and political economy in 
the wake of Downs (1957) predicts that policy makers will respond to such a shift in passing 
laws and regulations that accommodate such a shift. One likely consequence of such 
restrictive policies would be a lower recognition rate. In other words, the electoral success of 
right-wing populist parties often prompts governments and parliaments – no matter what their 
political orientation – to enact restrictive asylum policies with a view to winning back the 
14 
This version: August 2004voters and eroding the ground on which right-wing populist parties build their success. A 
good example for this is the July 1993 constitutional change of law in Germany denying the 
individual right to seek asylum to persons from “safe” countries of origins and those who 
have passed through “safe” third countries. Whilst the reasons for this constitutional change 
are manifold, it can be seen as a reaction to rampant hostility and violence against foreigners 
and particularly asylum seekers and the electoral success of right-wing populist parties in 
some of the German states (Länder). 
To see whether high numbers of asylum applications prompt destination countries to 
resort to lower recognition rates, we use two variables. First, the average number of total 
asylum seekers in the destination country in the past five to two years, normalized by the 
destination country population (PASTASYLUMTOTAL p.c.). Second, the average number of 
asylum seekers from a specific origin country who have applied to a destination country in 
the past five to two years, again normalized by destination country population 
(PASTASYLUMBYORIGIN p.c.). Data are taken from UNHCR (2001). The reason for 
including both variables is that total asylum numbers might exert downward pressure on all 
recognition rates, whereas high asylum numbers from specific origin countries might lead to 
lower recognition rates for asylum claims from these specific countries. We take the average 
of the past two to five years of these two variables for two reasons.
2 One is to average out 
coincidental temporary ups and downs. Second, and more important, taking past values deals 
with the problem that the current number of asylum seekers is endogenous to the current or 
past recognition rates as we have argued further above. Taking past numbers of asylum 
seekers therefore avoids the simultaneity bias. 
In addition to economic and political characteristics of the destination countries as well 
as the total number of past asylum applications, we also want to test the impact of conditions 
in origin countries on recognition rates. To do so, we include the origin country GDP per 
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This version: August 2004capita in purchasing power parity and constant US$ of 1997 (GDP p.c.). Faced with the 
paucity of data on unemployment rates, poverty incidence and the like in countries of origin 
this represents our only variable of general economic conditions in countries of origin. Data 
are taken from World Bank (2001) as the primary source and from Summers & Heston 
(1991) and WHO (2000) as supplementary sources. 
To measure political oppression we constructed an autocracy variable as the unweighted 
sum of the political rights and civil liberties index (AUTOCRACY) published by Freedom 
House (2001). In this source, political rights refer to, for example, the freedom to organize in 
political parties or groupings, the existence of party competition and an effective opposition 
as well as the existence and fairness of elections including the possibility to take over power 
via those elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of the media, the right to 
open and free discussions, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of religious expression, the 
protection from political terror and the prevalence of the rule of law. The two indices are 
based on surveys among experts assessing the extent to which a country effectively respects 
political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. 
As a measure of human rights violations (RIGHTS VIOLATION), we use the two Purdue 
Political Terror Scales (PTS). One of the two PTS is based upon a codification of country 
information from Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 
(best) to 5 (worst). Analogously, the other scale is based upon information from the US 
Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
3 The simple average of 
the two scales was used for the present study. If one index was unavailable for a particular 
year, the other one available was taken over for the aggregate index. Data are taken from 
Gibney (2002). 
Threats to personal integrity stemming from events of civil and ethnic wars as well as the 
collapse of state authority (DOMWAR/STATEFAIL) is measured by the maximum of 
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This version: August 2004magnitude scores, each measured on a zero to four scale, as coded for such events by the US 
State Failure Task Force Project. For civil and ethnic wars the magnitude refers to the portion 
of country affected by fighting, whereas for state failure the magnitude refers to the extent of 
failure of state authority. Data are taken from Marshall, Gurr and Harff (2001). In addition, 
we use a magnitude score measuring the annual number of deaths from genocide and 
politicide (GEN/POLITICIDE) from the same source.
4 Genocide and politicide are defined as 
the calculated physical destruction of a communal or political group in whole or part (Harff 
and Gurr 1988). 
With respect to interstate war, we constructed a variable measuring the extent of external 
armed conflict (EXTWAR) based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Gleditsch et 
al. 2002). We prefer this data set to the well known Correlates of War data set (Singer 2003) 
as it has a lower minimum threshold of 25 casualties for coding an event as violent conflict as 
opposed to the 1000 casualties threshold of the Correlates of War project. The variable was 
coded as zero if there was either no armed conflict on the territory of a country or armed 
conflict below the minimum threshold of 25 casualties. It was coded as one if there was a 
minor armed conflict, defined as any type of armed conflict resulting in more than 25 but less 
than 1000 casualties in any one year. The variable was coded as two, if the conflict was of 
intermediate nature, defined as at least 25 but less than 1000 casualties in any one year in 
addition to an accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths. Three is the code for large conflicts, 
which require more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year to qualify. Note that the 
reference point for coding is whether the conflict takes place on the territory of a country, 
whereas a conflict is not coded for a country participating in a conflict outside its own 
territory. 
Table 3 provides summary descriptive variable information, table 4 a bivariate 
correlation matrix. Clearly, with very few exceptions, bivariate correlations are not very high. 
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This version: August 2004In addition, variance inflation factors were computed for the regression models reported 
below without country fixed effects, which were all well below 2.5. Together this suggests no 
reason to be concerned about multicollinearity. 
 
< Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here > 
 
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
We estimate the following model 
 
yijt = α + β1xijt + εijt , where εijt = ui + wj + vijt. (1) 
 
The subscript i represents each destination country, the subscript j each country of origin 
in year t, y is the recognition rate. The vector x contains the explanatory variables. The ui 
represent individual unobserved or latent destination country effects. The wj represent 
individual unobserved origin country effects. The country-specific fixed effects are included 
in some of the regressions reported below to ensure that any time-invariant aspect of 
destination and origin countries is controlled for such that correlation of the explanatory 
variables with the fixed effects does not bias our estimations. The vijt is a stochastic error 
term. 
We estimate our model with ordinary least squares (OLS). We employ standard errors 
that are fully robust towards arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and adjusted for 
the clustering of observations, i.e. observations are merely assumed to be independent across, 
but not necessarily within, destination countries.  
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This version: August 2004EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
CONVERGENCE IN ASYLUM RECOGNITION RATES? 
Before estimating the determinants of recognition rates, we first want to analyze their extent 
of variation and whether or not we observe convergence over time. Following Noll (2000, 
233-235), there are two reasons why one might expect little variation in recognition rates 
across EU and other Western European countries. First, all Western European countries are 
parties to the Geneva Convention, to the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
United Nations Convention against Torture. They are therefore subject to the same formal 
obligations with respect to the treatment of asylum claims. In reality, however, we observe 
substantial differences in the interpretation by developed countries of their formal 
obligations. Second, the competition amongst potential destination countries induces the 
more popular countries to seek harmonization with other countries to share the burden of 
asylum seeking. In reality, however, only limited actual harmonization has taken place with 
respect to the standards of asylum recognition. This is despite the 1996 Joint Position on the 
harmonized application of the definition of the term “Refugee” in Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention (OJ (1996) L63), the 2000 Communication from the European Commission 
called ‘Towards a Common Asylum Procedure’ (COM (2000) 755) and similar follow-up 
attempts at harmonization. It is also in line with the resistance of the less popular asylum 
destination countries against more general harmonization and burden-sharing efforts 
(Neumayer 2004). Indeed, with the exception of Sweden no country changed its legislation in 
the period of our study following the non-binding Joint Position (Noll 2000, 239). Even if it 
were binding, the Joint Position does not provide conclusive guidance on such important 
questions as persecution by non-state actors and the role of safe areas in countries of origin 
(so-called internal flight alternatives) for the recognition of asylum claims. 
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This version: August 2004In the following we will therefore analyze to what extent recognition rates vary across 
Western European countries and whether or not they are converging over time.
5 As a measure 
















where N is the number of destination countries, Xi is the relevant recognition rate of 
country i, and  X is the arithmetic mean across destination countries. Note that the numerator 
is nothing else but the standard deviation. A value of zero would indicate no variation and 
higher values indicate greater variation. A decreasing COV over time indicates convergence, 
whereas an increasing COV signals divergence. 
It is tempting to undertake this or a similar analysis with respect to total aggregate 
recognition rates, as in Holzer and Schneider (2001), for example. However, such an analysis 
would be misleading. This is because the allocation of asylum seekers from specific countries 
of origin is not even across destination countries. One therefore needs to analyze origin-
specific recognition rates. Unfortunately, this leads to a great many origin-specific COVs, 
namely as many as there are countries of origin. To arrive at some aggregate picture, the 
origin-specific COVs can be averaged. This can be done in either of two ways: First, as the 
simple arithmetic mean or second, as a weighted average where the weights are determined 
by the relative importance of origin-countries in terms of the number of asylum seekers from 
a country of origin divided by the total number of asylum seekers. The latter is perhaps more 
appropriate as one might be more concerned about variation and lack of convergence in 
recognition rates of important sending countries than of countries, from which hardly any 
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the number of asylum seekers across various countries of origin. 
Table 5 provides estimates of the average COV for both the recognition rate for full 
refugee status and the recognition rate for the combined refugee and other allowance to 
remain statuses applying both methods. Clearly, there is substantial variation in recognition 
rates across Western European countries. By and large, variation is less if recognition rates 
are weighted by the relative importance of origin countries. In other words, for the 
substantively more important groups of asylum seekers there is slightly less variation. On the 
whole, there is also more variation in the recognition rate for full refugee status than for 
recognition rates for the combined refugee and other allowance to remain statuses. 
Interestingly, there is no indication for convergence of either rate, whether weighted or not, 
over the period of study. In conclusion therefore, there is great variation in recognition rates 
that has not shrunk over time. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
DETERMINANTS OF RECOGNITION RATES 
We now want to analyze the determinants of variation in recognition rates. We start with the 
recognition rate for the combined full refugee and other allowance to remain statuses and a 
model that contains neither origin-, nor destination-specific fixed effects. We then add 
destination- and origin-specific effects. Finally, from this last model we drop all insignificant 
variables to check the stability of results. 
Table 6 provides estimation results. As mentioned, in column I no fixed effects are 
included. Neither the aggregate nor the origin-specific past number of asylum claims in a 
destination country has a statistically significant impact upon recognition rates. The same is 
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conditions in countries of origin, asylum applications from poorer countries have a lower 
recognition rate. The political conditions in origin countries also matter. The recognition rate 
is higher for asylum claims from countries that are more autocratic, that have a higher 
incidence of human rights violations, that experience a greater level of inter-state violent 
conflict and a greater incidence of genocide and politicide events. The extent of civil war and 
state failure is not significant, however. In column II, we add both destination- and origin-
specific fixed effects to the model. The results are remarkably consistent. The only major 
changes are that, conditional on the fixed effects, the income level of the country of origin no 
longer has any statistically significant influence on the recognition rate, whereas higher 
income levels in destination countries are associated with lower recognition rates. The 
interpretation with respect to the income level in origin countries is that asylum applications 
from poorer countries face lower recognition rates, as in the absence of fixed effects the 
results draw on both cross-sectional and over-time variation. But rates do not become higher 
as countries achieve higher income levels over time, a conclusion derived from the fixed 
effects estimation, which draws on the over-time variation within countries only. The 
interpretation with respect to the income level in destination countries is not so clear-cut. This 
is because the fixed effects also control for differences in statistical classification and legal 
definition. Cross-sectional differences between poorer and richer destination countries might 
well exist, but they could be masked by such differences if we do not control for destination-
specific fixed effects. In column III we drop all the variables, which were statistically 
insignificant in column II, from the model. All the remaining variables perform as before. If 
the per capita income level of the origin country, which was significant in column I, is 
additionally included, it remains insignificant as in column II and the other variables are 
hardly affected (results not shown). 
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Estimation results for the recognition rate for the full refugee status only are reported in 
table 7. We start again with a model that does not contain any fixed effects. Results are 
broadly similar to the ones for the combined statuses. Recognition rates are positively 
associated with a destination country’s per capita income level. They are higher for richer 
countries of origin, implying that asylum seekers from poorer countries face lower 
recognition rates. Political repression, human rights violation, external armed conflict and 
episodes of genocide and politicide all raise the recognition rate, whereas the extent of civil 
war is again insignificant. Inclusion of destination- and origin-country fixed effects leads to 
the results reported in column II. As with the combined statuses, the per capita income level 
of the country of origin is no longer statistically significant in this model. Contrary to column 
I, a higher number of country-specific past asylum seekers is associated with a lower 
recognition rate. Another difference to the results without fixed effects is that a higher 
unemployment rate in the destination country is associated with a lower recognition rate. If 
we exclude the insignificant variables from this model, then results on the remaining 
variables are hardly affected (column III). If, in addition, we include the per capita income of 
origin countries, which was significant in column I, then results hardly change and this 
additional variable is insignificant as in column II (results not shown). 
 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
 
In our reported results, the destination-specific dummy variables are estimated as 
differences from the average. In other words, they show how much each country’s 
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European countries after controlling for variation in the explanatory variables. These 
differences must be interpreted with care. First, as stated already they are averages across 
origin countries. Second, they cannot be interpreted directly as differences in the generosity 
of destination countries because, as noted above, they also capture differences in coverage of 
what decisions are included in the statistics. Third, they are contingent on the effect of the 
explanatory variables included in the model. Nevertheless, these qualifications 
notwithstanding, one salient feature is the substantial disparity in estimated country fixed 
effects, which supports the results from the coefficient of variation analysis above. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The existence of substantial variation in origin-specific recognition rates together with the 
lack of convergence in recognition rates over time across the Western European countries 
presents substantial reason for concern. The restrictions on the choice of asylum destination 
country introduced in the wake of the Dublin Convention can only be justified if asylum 
seekers can broadly expect equal and fair treatment no matter where their asylum claim is 
processed. As we have seen, such treatment is not guaranteed. Whilst there are many 
different aspects to the processing of an asylum claim, whether or not the claim is finally 
recognized represents a very important feature to the asylum seeker. This article’s analysis 
has demonstrated that Western European countries have still a long way to go before they 
offer anything resembling a unified or at least convergent chance of recognizing asylum 
claims that prima facie appear to be the same in terms of merit. 
Future research needs to address the reasons for lack of convergence. Western European 
countries have tried and to a great extent succeeded in converging other aspects of their 
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lists of “safe” third countries, “safe” origin countries, visa restrictions, sanctions against 
airlines bringing in passengers without valid visa and the like (Böcker and Havinga 1998; 
Havinga and Böcker 1999; Schuster 2000; Noll 2000; Gibney and Hansen 2002). More 
limited convergence has been achieved for the conditions of reception and the rights and 
obligations that asylum seekers face once they are allowed into the asylum application 
process. Why does convergence not extend to recognition rates? 
Strictly speaking, the great extent of variation in origin-specific recognition rates across 
destination countries is no conclusive proof for unequal treatment. As UNHCR (2002, 46) 
points out, ‘divergent recognition rates for the same nationality during the same period may 
well be explained when the detailed profile of the individual claimant is taken into account’. 
However, it is most unlikely that vast differences in recognition rates exist because 
individuals whose asylum claims carry low merit apply in one destination country, whereas 
other individuals from the same country, but whose asylum claims carry high merit, apply in 
another destination country. 
Bronkhorst (1991: 151) concludes that ‘asylum decisions in Western Europe are highly 
arbitrary’. The German refugee interest group Pro-Asyl (2000) similarly argues that, in the 
face of substantial cross-country differences in asylum recognition rates, the chances of 
becoming recognized as a refugee or otherwise allowed to remain in the country resembles a 
lottery where the odds of winning are contingent on the country, in which the claim is 
processed. Such damning verdicts are understandable given the wide variation in recognition 
rates across Western European countries. But our analysis of the determinants of recognition 
rates has shown that there is also another aspect of the recognition process that provides more 
ground for cautious optimism. Both types of recognition rates are influenced by political 
conditions in origin countries in terms of regime type, extent of human rights violations, 
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recognition rate is influenced by the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. The 
recognition rate for the combined statuses is also not lower in times of poor economic 
conditions in destination countries. Higher numbers of past asylum seekers, either in terms of 
aggregate or specific numbers for origin countries, also do not put downward pressure on the 
combined recognition rate. 
This optimism needs to be qualified, however, for a number of reasons. First, for both the 
full and the combined recognition statuses, rates of recognition are lower for asylum seekers 
coming from poorer countries, unless country-specific fixed effects are included in the 
analysis. This suggests that those coming from poorer countries will find it harder to 
convince the decision authorities that their claim of persecution is genuine and that he or she 
is not merely an economic migrant. 
Second, the recognition rate for full refugee status is somewhat more vulnerable to an 
influence outside the merit of the asylum claim as both a higher unemployment rate and a 
higher origin-specific number of past asylum seekers is associated with a lower recognition 
rate. That the recognition rate for full refugee status is more vulnerable to such conditions is 
in accordance with the observation that destination countries tend to shift asylum seekers into 
statuses with lower protection levels when unemployment rates are high and the perception of 
being over-burdened by asylum seekers is popular. 
Third, recognition rates do not vary with the extent of civil war and state failure in origin 
countries. Only more qualitative future research can show why this is the case. One reason 
could be that many destination countries are reluctant to accept persecution by non-state 
agents as valid grounds for asylum (ECRE 2000b) and such non-state agent persecution is 
particularly likely in civil war and state failure events. A Joint Position Paper of the Council 
of the European Union (1996, para. 6) states that ‘reference to a civil war or internal or 
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warrant the grant of refugee status. Fear of persecution must in all cases (…) be individual in 
nature’. 
Fourth, another reason for caution is that our variables or estimation methods might fail 
to detect more subtle influences of economic and political conditions in destination countries 
on recognition rates. Even if we take our results on recognition rates at face value, there are 
other aspects of the asylum process such as the reception conditions and the generosity of 
welfare benefits to asylum seekers that are likely to be subject to political and economic 
conditions in destination countries. 
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1 I thank two anonymous referees and the editor for many helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine. The 
data and a do-file replicating the reported results are available at http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. 
2 At the start of the panel this variable goes back fewer years to avoid a five year loss of observations. 
3 Codification is according to rules as follows: 1. Countries … under a secure rule of law, people are not 
imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional… Political murders are extraordinarily rare. 2. 
There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few are affected, torture 
and beatings are exceptional… Political murder is rare. 3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent 
history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited 
detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted… 4. The practices of Level 3 are expanded to 
larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life.. In spite of its generality, on 
this level violence affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 5. The violence of Level 4 
has been extended to the whole population… The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or 
thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
4 We add 0.5 to the original score to distinguish the absence of such events from the presence of such events 
with an annual number of deaths of less than 300. 
5 The results reported below are hardly affected if one excluded Norway and Switzerland from the analysis and 
thereby restricted the sample to EU countries only. 
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This version: August 2004Table 1. Asylum applications in industrialized countries 1980 to 1999 (in thousands). 
Country 1980-84  1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 1980-99





Total 793.83  1495.63 3373.32 2751.78 8414.55  
Northern America 201.16  368.97 673.67 773.27 2017.08 23.97 
Europe, of which:  592.03  1125.17 2650.99 1933.40 6301.59 74.89 
   Austria  63.24  64.44 76.16 53.53 257.37 3.06  31.81
   Belgium  14.48  32.11 87.02 93.39 226.99 2.70  22.20
   Denmark  5.60  29.98 44.78 37.79 118.15 1.40  22.18
   Finland  0.07  0.33 11.37 6.92 18.69 0.22  3.62
   France  106.34  178.66 184.59 112.26 581.86 6.91  9.93
   Germany  249.65  455.25 1337.19 542.41 2584.51 30.71  31.48
   Greece  6.44  23.99 12.80 11.81 55.04 0.65  5.22
   Italy  11.59  19.64 37.62 48.75 117.59 1.40  2.04
   Ireland  -  - 0.52 17.84 18.36 0.22  4.89
   Netherlands  8.78  46.36 151.14 170.39 376.66 4.48  23.83
   Norway  0.75  23.20 30.02 24.04 78.01 0.93  17.49
   Portugal  4.34  1.27 3.87 1.69 11.17 0.13  1.12
   Spain  5.38  15.71 53.10 30.44 104.63 1.24  2.65
   Sweden  41.93  97.14 197.01 48.54 384.62 4.57  43.42
   Switzerland  29.70  70.31 136.30 146.37 382.69 4.55  53.15
   United Kingdom 17.47  28.55 150.85 223.27 420.13 4.99  7.06
 
Source: Own computations from UNHCR (2001). 
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1984-84 1985-89  1990-94  1995-99 
Turkey 90034 Turkey 152461 Yugoslavia  519868 Yugoslavia  399921
Poland 81424 Poland 132450 Romania  349820 Turkey 170066
Iran 33535 Iran 119764 Turkey  182994 Iraq 161202
Sri Lanka  30067 Sri Lanka  75406 Bosnia-Herz.  114066 Afghanistan  83936
Pakistan 29689 Yugoslavia  62540 Bulgaria  96465 Sri  Lanka 66829
Czechoslov. 25789 Lebanon  45725 Sri  Lanka  85687 Iran  60762
Vietnam 21478 Ghana  38573 Iraq  70580 Somalia  55743
Ghana  20632 Romania 36263 Iran  68539 Romania 52655
India  17452 Congo (Zaire) 31221 Congo (Zaire) 68215 Bosnia-Herz.  51035
Romania 16758 India  29204 Somalia  65263 Pakistan  42561
Afghanistan 15557 Pakistan  26891 Afghanistan  55633 Congo  (Zaire)  40007
Cambodia 15141 Ethiopia  24159 Vietnam  55424 Algeria  38184
Hungary 14800 Czechoslov.    23552 Lebanon  53016 India  34941
Ethiopia  12665 Hungary 23421 India  48492 Armenia 34521
Congo (Zaire)  10534 Chile  20247 Albania  46468 China  32192
Iraq 10260 Iraq  18549 Pakistan  46279 Nigeria  31370
Lebanon 9312 Afghanistan  15393 Nigeria  43866 Russia  29407
Chile 8936 Vietnam  14557 Russia  39927 Albania  23044
Lao PDR  8098 Angola  14281 Ghana  39659 Georgia  19131
Yugoslavia 5078 Somalia  12497 Poland  35247 Bangladesh 18395
Bangladesh 3837 Bangladesh 10894 Algeria  34131 Vietnam  18378
Angola 3274 Syria  10329 Angola 32789 Sierra  Leone  18195
Haiti 2925 Bulgaria  8712 Ethiopia  25640 Syria 16947
Syria 2533 Cambodia  8255 China  25341 Bulgaria  15326
Egypt. 1925 Lao  PDR  7948 Liberia  19605 Angola  14638
Bulgaria 1864 Mali  7869 Togo  17671 Sudan  13603
Armenia 1271 Nigeria  5985 Bangladesh  16230 Azerbaijan  12998
Albania 1156 Haiti  5568 Syria  15225 Ukraine 12915
Guinea 842 China  4519 Armenia  13166 Macedonia  12659
Gambia 783 Guinea  4241 Peru  11185 Lebanon  11287
 
Source: Own computations from UNHCR (2001). 
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Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Recognition rate (combined statuses)  10290 0.29  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Recognition rate (full protection status only)  10290 0.19  0.30  0.00  1.00 
PASTASYLUMTOTAL p.c.  10290 1.19  1.14  0.01  4.95 
PASTASYLUMBYORIGIN p.c.  10290 0.02  0.08  0.00  2.68 
ln GDP p.c. (destination country)  10290 9.95  0.18  9.30  10.26 
%UNEMPLOYED 10290 8.33  4.37  0.40  24.20 
%RIGHTPOPULIST 10290 4.85  5.69  0.00  23.00 
ln GDP p.c. (origin country)  10290 7.80  0.87  6.00  10.15 
AUTOCRACY 10290 9.85  3.32  2.00  14.00 
RIGHTS VIOLATION  10290 3.21  1.09  1.00  5.00 
EXTWAR 10290 0.20  0.71  0.00  3.00 
DOMWAR/STATEFAIL 10290 0.96  1.42  0.00  5.00 
GEN/POLITICIDE 10290 0.24  0.94  0.00  5.50 
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                            I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
I: RECOGNITION RATE (combined statuses) 1.000                        
II: RECOGNITION RATE (full status only)  0.757 1.000                      
III:  PASTASYLUMTOTAL  p.c.                
              
              
          
       
      
     
-0.106 -0.206 1.000
IV:  PASTASYLUMBYORIGIN  p.c. 0.039 -0.023 0.163 1.000
V:  %RIGHTPOPULIST -0.048 0.031 0.104 0.045 1.000
VI  %UNEMPLOYED 0.036 0.073 -0.384 -0.105 -0.231  1.000
VII: ln GDP p.c. (destination)  -0.126 -0.163 0.487 0.077 0.466  -0.561 1.000            
VIII:  ln  GDP  p.c.  (origin) -0.041 -0.015 0.014 0.105 -0.005  -0.041 -0.003 1.000
IX:  AUTOCRACY 0.292 0.266 -0.104 0.002 -0.059  0.024 -0.121 -0.401 1.000
X:  RIGHTS  VIOLATION 0.252 0.178 -0.067 0.062 -0.005  0.011 -0.054 -0.240 0.425 1.000
XI: EXTWAR  0.101 0.103 -0.096 0.006 -0.046  -0.015 -0.079 -0.115 0.107 0.238 1.000    
XII: DOMWAR/STATEFAIL  0.171 0.099 -0.027 0.014 -0.006  0.018 -0.042 -0.191 0.246 0.602 0.171 1.000  
XIII: GEN/POLITICIDE  0.157 0.139 -0.086 -0.002 -0.035  -0.003 -0.062 -0.152 0.229 0.309 0.230 0.463 1.000 
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 Recognition  rates 
(combined) 
Recognition rates 
(full protection status only)
year unweighted weighted unweighted  weighted 
1980 0.80  1.24  0.85  1.27 
1981 0.61  0.72  0.65  0.76 
1982 0.91  0.69  0.97  0.76 
1983 0.99  0.78  1.00  0.83 
1984 1.06  0.78  1.09  0.85 
1985 1.04  0.95  1.07  1.04 
1986 1.18  0.94  1.25  1.12 
1987 1.30  0.97  1.42  1.16 
1988 1.25  1.06  1.33  1.11 
1989 1.31  1.15  1.40  1.28 
1990 1.34  1.24  1.67  1.63 
1991 1.42  1.37  1.68  1.55 
1992 1.43  1.38  1.64  1.75 
1993 1.60  1.42  1.78  1.66 
1994 1.47  1.12  1.69  1.52 
1995 1.41  0.99  1.76  1.49 
1996 1.40  1.11  1.75  1.56 
1997 1.34  1.02  1.70  1.46 
1998 1.27  0.89  1.72  1.38 
1999 1.36  0.86  1.70  1.29 
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 I  II  III 
Destination-specific variables: 
 
   
PASTASYLUMTOTAL p.c.  -0.013  -0.008   
 (0.63)  (0.31)   
PASTASYLUMBYORIGIN p.c.  0.139  0.059   
 (1.34)  (0.86)   
ln GDP p.c.   -0.163  -0.582  -0.594 
 (0.92)  (4.22)**  (4.74)** 
%UNEMPLOYED -0.002  -0.003   
 (0.37)  (0.26)   
%RIGHTPOPULIST 0.000  0.000   
 (0.08)  (0.09)   
Origin-specific variables: 
 
   
ln GDP p.c.  0.040  -0.023   
 (5.80)**  (0.62)   
AUTOCRACY 0.026  0.019  0.021 
 (11.02)**  (5.04)**  (6.12)** 
RIGHTS VIOLATION  0.042  0.034  0.029 
 (6.31)**  (6.65)**  (5.90)** 
EXTWAR 0.015  0.021  0.020 
 (2.20)*  (3.33)**  (3.35)** 
DOMWAR/STATEFAIL 0.004  -0.006   
 (0.54)  (0.71)   
GEN/POLITICIDE 0.020  0.021  0.019 
 (3.51)**  (3.02)**  (2.66)* 
Destination dummy variables:    
      
AUSTRIA   -0.040  -0.024 
   (0.41)  (1.87*) 
BELGIUM   0.161  0.163 
   (10.30)***  (10.25)*** 
DENMARK   0.312  0.320 
   (11.11)***  (19.59)*** 
FINLAND   0.062  0.049 
   (0.94)  (12.61)*** 
FRANCE   0.034  0.036 
   (0.78)  (7.50)*** 
GERMANY   -0.122  -0.130 
   (4.28)***  (18.19)*** 
GREECE   -0.259  -0.256 
   (5.57)***  (4.84)*** 
IRELAND   -0.026  -0.014 
   (0.57)  (0.62) 
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   (0.03)  (0.09) 
NETHERLANDS   -0.048  -0.053 
   (1.18)  (4.86)*** 
NORWAY   0.043  0.050 
   (0.68)  (1.57) 
PORTUGAL   -.282  -.257 
   (6.67)***  (5.46)*** 
SPAIN   -0.133  -0.207 
   (0.69)  (5.82)*** 
SWEDEN   0.150  0.136 
   (2.07)*  (20.36)* 
SWITZERLAND   0.101  0.132 
   (0.92)  (3.76)*** 
UNITED KINGDOM    0.074  0.054 
   (2.65)**  (2.74)** 
Observations 10290  10290  12168 
R-squared 0.13  0.63  0.57 
 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. Standard errors robust towards arbitrary 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Origin-country specific fixed effects included in 
regressions II and III, but coefficients not reported. Observations assumed to be clustered 
within destination countries. 
* statistically significant at .1 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .01 level. 
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 I  II  III 
Destination-specific variables: 
 
   
PASTASYLUMTOTAL p.c.  -0.033  -0.012   
 (2.00)  (0.89)   
PASTASYLUMBYORIGIN p.c.  -0.071  -0.104  -0.110 
 (1.19)  (2.14)*  (2.47)* 
ln GDP p.c.   -0.221  -0.549  -0.648 
 (1.27)  (4.07)**  (7.40)** 
%UNEMPLOYED -0.001  -0.012  -0.014 
 (0.33)  (2.30)*  (2.65)* 
%RIGHTPOPULIST 0.006  -0.002   
 (1.82)  (0.60)   
Origin-specific variables: 
 
   
ln GDP p.c.  0.040  0.018   
 (6.36)**  (0.67)   
AUTOCRACY 0.023  0.017  0.017 
 (8.31)**  (5.43)**  (4.97)** 
RIGHTS VIOLATION  0.020  0.025  0.019 
 (2.67)*  (3.80)**  (3.36)** 
EXTWAR 0.020  0.024  0.021 
 (3.09)**  (5.60)**  (4.77)** 
DOMWAR/STATEFAIL -0.006  -0.008   
 (1.33)  (1.42)   
GEN/POLITICIDE 0.021  0.030  0.029 
 (4.24)**  (5.81)**  (5.41)** 
Destination dummy variables:    
      
AUSTRIA   -0.074  0.035 
   (1.51)  (1.57) 
BELGIUM   0.286  0.292 
   (17.09)***  (19.12)*** 
DENMARK   0.032  0.024 
   (2.57)**  (2.42)** 
FINLAND   -0.103  -0.080 
   (3.49)***  (3.96)*** 
FRANCE   0.175  0.172 
   (7.77)***  (11.59)*** 
GERMANY   -0.021  -0.020 
   (1.69)  (3.56)*** 
GREECE   -0.187  -0.211 
   (4.46)***  (6.03)*** 
IRELAND   0.046  0.078 
   (1.20)  (5.69)*** 
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   (7.34)***  (10.47)*** 
NETHERLANDS   -0.102  -0.097 
   (5.19)***  (11.03)*** 
NORWAY   -0.044  -0.046 
   (2.06)*  (2.20)* 
PORTUGAL   -.253  -.263 
   (5.27)***  (5.98)*** 
SPAIN   0.005  0.024 
   (0.09)  (0.38) 
SWEDEN   -0.061  -0.082 
   (2.50)**  (6.51)** 
SWITZERLAND   0.081  0.075 
   (2.66)**  (2.52)** 
UNITED KINGDOM    -0.065  -0.057 
   (5.46)***  (6.89)*** 
Observations 10290  10290  10801 
R-squared 0.14  0.57  0.57 
 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. Standard errors robust towards arbitrary 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Origin-country specific fixed effects included in 
regressions II and III, but coefficients not reported. Observations assumed to be clustered 
within destination countries. 
* statistically significant at .1 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .01 level. 
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